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ESSAY 
REDUCING INFORMATION GAPS TO REDUCE 
THE TAX GAP:  WHEN IS INFORMATION 
REPORTING WARRANTED? 
Leandra Lederman* 
A core problem for enforcement of tax laws is asymmetric information.  
The taxpayer knows the facts regarding the relevant transactions it engages 
in during the year—or at least has ready access to that information.  The 
government is forced to play catch-up, obtaining that information either 
from the taxpayer or from third parties. 
Information reporting is routinely used to address this information gap.  
The government obtains information about the taxpayer’s tax situation from 
a third party and—equally important—the taxpayer knows that the 
government has received that information.  This fosters taxpayer honesty. 
Information reporting is not a panacea, however.  It imposes costs on the 
private parties who are required to report.  Moreover, it will not be equally 
effective in all situations.  Generally speaking, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of information reporting varies with who the reporters are, what 
they are reporting about, and how much information they are required to 
include.  Accordingly, this Essay proposes six distinct factors as a 
framework for evaluating information reporting requirements.  This Essay 
also applies these factors to three information reporting proposals and 
three recently enacted reporting requirements that are scheduled to become 
effective in 2011. 
The proposed framework suggests that some of the laws and proposals 
will likely be much more effective than others in improving tax compliance.  
For example, the recent amendment requiring brokers to report basis in 
investments will likely prove very valuable, as would the proposed 
elimination of the reporting exemption for payments for services provided 
by certain small corporations.  Other information reporting laws and 
proposals have less promise.  For example, the new requirement for 
 
* William W. Oliver Professor of Tax Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law—
Bloomington.  I am grateful to Leslie Book, Kristen Fowler, and Joel Slemrod for helpful 
comments.  I also benefited from helpful discussions with Hannah Buxbaum, Stephen 
Mazza, Susan Morse, Aviva Orenstein, Alex Raskolnikov, participants in the Closing the 
Tax Gap conference at Stanford Law School, and participants in the 2009 Law and Society 
Association Annual Meeting.  Robert Christie and Michala Irons provided valuable research 
assistance. 
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information reporting by online auction sites such as eBay regarding the 
gross receipts of their high-volume sellers will likely make only a minimal 
impact on the tax gap.  Information reports in that context cannot include 
basis information that is known, if at all, only by the sellers.  Least 
worthwhile are proposals that require decentralized information reporting, 
particularly in non-arm’s-length contexts, such as requiring reporting by 
recipients of gifts in excess of the annual gift-tax-free limit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The federal tax gap—the gap each year between taxes due and taxes 
paid—is enormous.  The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has estimated the 
gross tax gap at $345 billion for 2001,1 and that did not include all unpaid 
taxes.2  To put that figure in perspective, it amounts to approximately three-
fourths of the 2008 federal budget deficit and exceeds the deficits in 2005 
through 2007.3  To the extent that gap can be narrowed at a cost that is low 
 
 1. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps:  The Roles Third Parties Play in 
Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 711 (2007) (citing Dustin Stamper, Everson Pledges 
To Narrow Growing Tax Gap, 110 TAX NOTES 807, 807 (2006)). 
 2. The tax gap estimate only reflects legal-source income. See William L. Burke, Tax 
Information Reporting and Compliance in the Cross-Border Context, 27 VA. TAX REV. 399, 
400 n.1 (2007).  It also does not include all unreported income from international activity. 
See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATIONS, 
A COMBINATION OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS AND INCREASED IRS CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY 
ARE REQUIRED TO REDUCE THE MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX GAP 
(2009), http://www.treas.gov/tigta/iereports/2009reports/2009IER001fr.html (“Non-IRS 
estimates of the international tax gap range from $40 billion to $123 billion.  While there 
might be overlap between the IRS tax gap estimate and the international tax gap, it is 
doubtful that the $345 billion estimate includes the entire international tax gap.”). 
 3. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, MONTHLY BUDGET REVIEW 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9912/11-2008-MBR.pdf (reporting federal budget 
deficit of $455 billion for fiscal year 2008, $162 billion for 2007, $248 billion for 2006, and 
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in comparison to the additional funds collected, the government can use the 
funds to reduce the deficit, to lower other taxes,4 or to reduce debt financing 
of bailouts and other spending.5  
A core problem for enforcement of tax laws is asymmetric information.  
One aspect of the problem is that the taxpayer knows the facts regarding the 
relevant transactions he or she engaged in during the tax year—or at least 
has ready access to that information.  The government is forced to obtain 
that information after the fact, either from the taxpayer or from third 
parties.6 
The government’s direct use of that information is for enforcement.  
More important, however, is the indirect deterrent effect of enforcement 
because the magnitude of that effect is so much larger than the direct return 
from enforcement activities.7  The taxpayer’s perception of the probability 
that cheating will be detected influences the compliance decision.  
Accordingly, any information that the taxpayer knows the government has 
about the taxpayer’s activities will foster honesty.8  This dynamic highlights 
a different information asymmetry:  the government knows more about its 
enforcement activities than taxpayers do.9 
 
$318 billion for 2005).  The federal budget deficit for fiscal year 2009 was the much larger 
figure of $1.4 trillion. See Jackie Calmes, U.S. Deficit Rises to $1.4 Trillion; Biggest Since 
’45, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2009, at A1.  
 4. Tax noncompliance has been estimated to cost each American taxpayer 
approximately $2000 each year. See Danshera Cords, Tax Protestors and Penalties:  
Ensuring Perceived Fairness and Mitigating Systemic Costs, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1515, 1522 
(citing AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, UNDERSTANDING TAX REFORM:  A 
GUIDE TO 21ST CENTURY ALTERNATIVES 6, 29 (2005)).  
 5. The bailouts in 2008 included the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program and 
the $200 billion bailout of Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac. See Sam Goldfarb, House Passes TARP 
Reform That Would Let Treasury Buy Municipal Bonds, 122 TAX NOTES 465, 465 (2009); 
David E. Libman, Our Nation Needs a Simplified Health Savings Account System, 121 TAX 
NOTES 315 (2008).  In addition, as of April 2009, the government had provided to the auto 
industry loans and other funding totaling $36.4 billion. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
AUTO INDUSTRY:  SUMMARY OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS AND AUTOMAKERS’ RESTRUCTURING 
TO DATE 15 tbl.2 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09553.pdf. 
 6. See Cords, supra note 4, at 1543–44. 
 7. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. DUBIN, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 
AND TAXPAYER NONCOMPLIANCE 21 (2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/04dubin.pdf (finding, in a study of 1988–2001 IRS data, that “an additional dollar 
allocated to audit would return $58 in general deterrence”); Alan H. Plumley, The Impact of 
the IRS on Voluntary Tax Compliance:  Preliminary Empirical Results 8–10 (Nov. 14, 
2002), reprinted in 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 224-22 (IRS paper presented at the National 
Tax Association 95th Annual Conference on Taxation) (“[T]he average indirect effect of . . . 
audits started in 1991 was about 11.7 times as large as the average adjustment directly 
proposed by audits closed that year.”). 
 8. See Lederman, supra note 1, at 697 (analogizing information reporting by third 
parties to “red light cameras” that visibly provide information to the government about law 
violation). 
 9. For example, under Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 6103, the government is 
entitled to confidentiality of its audit selection procedures. See W. Edward Afield, Agency 
Activism as a New Way of Life:  Administrative Modification of the Internal Revenue Code 
Through Limited Issue Focused Examinations, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 455, 479–80 (2006). 
LEDERMAN_10_03_01POSBP_PAGINATED 3/2/2010  10:49 AM 
1736 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
Information reporting is a prime example of a technique used to solve 
both types of information asymmetries at the prefiling stage.  Withholding 
is well known to be highly effective in ensuring payment, but IRS data 
show that information reporting in the absence of withholding is almost as 
effective.10  With information reporting, the government obtains 
information about the taxpayer’s tax situation from a third party and—
equally important—the taxpayer knows that the government has the 
information.11 
Information reporting imposes costs on the private parties who are 
required to report.  It is certainly not a panacea.12  Moreover, it will not be 
equally effective in all situations.  As discussed below, it matters who the 
reporters are, what they are reporting about, and how much information 
they include.13  Accordingly, this Essay proposes a series of factors that 
predict how efficient and effective an information reporting requirement 
would likely be. 
The factors, in turn, facilitate evaluation of proposals that have been 
advanced by academics; the Treasury Department; the National Taxpayer 
Advocate;14 and others to require increased information reporting in various 
contexts, as well as several recently enacted reporting requirements.15  
 
 10. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX YEAR 2001 TAX GAP UPDATE 2 (2007) 
[hereinafter TAX YEAR 2001], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax_gap_update_
070212.pdf (estimating 1.2% of amounts subject to substantial information reporting and 
withholding not to be reported and 4.5% of amounts subject to substantial information 
reporting but not withholding not to be reported); see also Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths 
About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 506, 511 (2007) (“By now 
almost everyone knows the tremendous bang for the buck we get with third-party reporting.  
Current rules impose relatively minor compliance costs and effectively capture most 
income.”). 
 11. See Lederman, supra note 1, at 697. 
 12. See id. at 698 n.10 (citing Richard M. Bird, Administrative Dimensions of Tax 
Reform, 10 ASIA-PAC. TAX BULL. 134, 136 (2004)). 
 13. Cf. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 
NW. U. L. REV. 655, 666 (2006) (“[A] chief advantage of structural laws is that they regulate 
centralized institutions rather than individuals. Institutions, usually in the form of 
corporations, are easier to regulate because they are smaller in number, have known 
locations, and have significant economic incentives to comply with government mandates.”). 
 14. Congress established the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate, which is supervised by 
the National Taxpayer Advocate. I.R.C. § 7803(c)(1)(A)–(B)(i) (2006).  The functions of the 
office are to 
(i) assist taxpayers in resolving problems with the Internal Revenue Service; (ii) 
identify areas in which taxpayers have problems in dealings with the Internal 
Revenue Service; (iii) to the extent possible, propose changes in the administrative 
practices of the Internal Revenue Service to mitigate problems identified under 
clause (ii); and (iv) identify potential legislative changes which may be appropriate 
to mitigate such problems. 
Id. § 7803(c)(2)(A).  Nina Olson is the National Taxpayer Advocate. See Michael Joe et al., 
Taxpayer Advocate Recommends Help for Distressed Taxpayers, 122 TAX NOTES 185, 185 
(2009). 
 15. This Essay does not address all recent information reporting proposals.  For 
example, it does not address the proposal in President Barack Obama’s fiscal year 2010 
budget to require taxpayers who receive non-trade or business rental income and deduct 
related expenses to issue information reports to those who perform work costing $600 or 
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Application of the factors suggests that requiring reporting by brokers of 
basis in securities—as Congress did as part of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 200816—should prove very valuable, as would 
eliminating the reporting exemption for payments to service providers 
organized as closely held corporations.  At the other extreme, requiring 
decentralized information reporting, particularly in non-arm’s-length 
contexts, such as by recipients of gifts in excess of the annual gift-tax-free 
limit, would be least worthwhile. 
The remainder of this Essay proceeds in two principal parts.  Part I 
considers what makes information reporting effective, setting forth a 
framework for evaluating information reporting proposals.  The framework 
contains structural factors such as how much information a report would be 
able to provide the government relative to the type of information needed to 
verify that item on the taxpayer’s return. 
Part II of the Essay uses the proposed framework to evaluate the relative 
efficiency of three recent information reporting proposals and three recently 
enacted requirements that have not yet taken effect.  It finds that some of 
the proposals and one of the new laws will likely help narrow the federal 
tax gap, while others are likely to be ineffective. 
I.  WHAT MAKES INFORMATION REPORTING EFFECTIVE? 
“Voluntary” compliance with U.S. federal taxes—compliance without 
enforcement efforts on the part of the government—is sometimes said to be 
surprisingly high, given that audit and penalty rates are not high enough to 
make compliance the economically rational choice.17  However, the reality 
is that audits are not the only tool the government has that makes the 
probability of detection high and compliance rational.  As is by now well 
known, much of the work of assuring voluntary compliance is done by third 
parties, through withholding of taxes on wages and salaries, as well as 
 
more on the rental property. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 58 (2009) [hereinafter FISCAL 
YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS], available at http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-
policy/library/grnbk09.pdf.  Similarly, the Essay does not address information reporting 
proposals addressing cross-border transfers, such as the proposal to require certain financial 
intermediaries to report transfers of money or property with a value of more than $10,000 to 
a foreign bank, brokerage, or other financial account on behalf of a U.S. person. See id. at 
48.  However, the six factors discussed below are just as applicable to these proposals as 
they are to the proposals and laws discussed in detail in this Essay. 
 16. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. 
 17. See, e.g., James Alm, Isabel Sanchez & Ana de Juan, Economic and Noneconomic 
Factors in Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3, 3 (1995) (“[T]he puzzle of tax compliance is not 
so much ‘Why is there so much cheating?[’]  Instead, the real puzzle is ‘Why is there so little 
cheating?’”); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms:  The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. 
L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000) (“A widespread view among tax scholars holds that law 
enforcement does not explain why people pay taxes.”). But cf. Leandra Lederman, Tax 
Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 974–76 (2003) (rebutting this 
view). 
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information reporting regarding those payments and others, such as interest; 
dividends; and payments to independent contractors.18 
The IRS’s study of the 2001 tax year, under the auspices of its National 
Research Program, reveals that information reporting makes the single 
biggest difference in compliance rates—approximately forty-five 
percentage points: 
 Amounts subject to withholding (e.g., wages and salaries) have a net 
misreporting percentage of only 1.2 percent.  Amounts subject to third-
party information reporting, but not to withholding (e.g., interest and 
dividend income) have a slightly higher net misreporting percentage of 
4.5 percent.  Amounts subject to partial third-party reporting (e.g., capital 
gains) have a still higher net misreporting percentage of 8.6 percent.  
Amounts not subject to withholding or information reporting (e.g., 
Schedule C income and “other income”) are the least visible, with a much 
higher net misreporting percentage of 53.9 percent.19  
It is no coincidence that information reporting is so effective.  The 
government suffers from an information asymmetry in enforcing the tax 
laws because taxpayers are the ones who know the facts regarding their 
activities in the first instance.  The IRS therefore has to learn that 
information after the fact, either from those taxpayers or from third parties.  
Information reporting by third parties as to particular amounts the taxpayer 
received for a particular reason reduces that information gap.  However, if 
information reports were sent by the third party only to the federal 
government, they likely would not have such a dramatic effect on voluntary 
compliance.  Instead, that reporting would simply empower the government 
with a tool to use on audit.20  What likely makes information reporting so 
 
 18. See Lederman, supra note 1, at 697 & nn.7–8.  Thus, the comparison between 
comparatively high compliance rates and low audit rates ignores the fact that information 
reporting—transparency, which increases the probability of detection—accounts for much of 
the overall (average) voluntary compliance rate of approximately eighty-four percent. See id. 
at 697; Lederman, supra note 17, at 974; Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms 
and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1460 (2003). 
 19. Charles P. Rettig, Nonfilers Beware:  Who’s That Knocking at Your Door?, J. TAX 
PRAC. & PROC., Oct.–Nov. 2006, at 19, 19–20; see also TAX YEAR 2001, supra note 10, at 2. 
 20. The IRS apparently makes good use of information reports, though it does not 
pursue nearly all discrepancies: 
According to IRS, after correction, about 98 percent of the information returns it 
receives are potentially usable for matching purposes . . . . 
  After going through the matching process, IRS pursues millions of 
discrepancies above certain dollar thresholds; according to IRS officials, millions 
of other discrepancies above the thresholds are not pursued because of resource 
constraints. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX ADMINISTRATION:  COSTS AND USES OF THIRD-
PARTY INFORMATION RETURNS 11 (2007) [hereinafter, GAO, COSTS AND USES], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08266.pdf.  As the quotation above suggests, the IRS does 
not pursue discrepancies below a certain dollar threshold. Id. app. I, at 60.  Of those above 
the threshold, for tax years 2003 through 2005, the IRS pursued twenty-eight to thirty-one 
percent of the discrepancies in underreporting cases and thirty-five to fifty-nine percent in 
nonfiling cases. See id. app. I, at 61. 
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successful in spurring compliance in the first instance is that, like “red light 
cameras” that snap pictures of vehicles failing to stop for a red light, the 
taxpayer is aware that the government is watching.21 
Information reporting is certainly a valuable tool in the government’s 
enforcement arsenal, and it has not gone unnoticed by scholars and policy 
makers.22  In fact, if anything, it has been recommended for too broad an 
array of contexts.  In some situations, the costs of information reporting 
would outweigh the benefits.23  In evaluating proposals to expand the scope 
of information reporting, it is therefore helpful to identify the context in 
which it is successful.  In general, the following six factors are relevant: 
 (1) Arm’s-length parties.  Because the government will use an 
information report to verify that the taxpayer has reported the same 
information on his or her return, information reporting is of most 
use where the possibility of collusion is relatively small.  This 
suggests that contexts involving parties who generally act at arm’s 
length (such as service recipient and service provider) are more 
suitable for information reporting than are contexts involving 
related parties (such as family members).24  In addition, the 
possibility of collusion to avoid or falsify information reporting is 
reduced where the reporting party obtains a tax benefit that 
increases with the amount reported, as in the case of a non-tax-
exempt employer reporting wages on a Form W-2.25 
 
  Nina Olson has proposed accelerating the IRS’s processing of information returns so 
that it would send out fewer refunds before processing those returns. See NAT’L TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE, REPORT TO CONGRESS:  FISCAL YEAR 2010 OBJECTIVES xxii (2009), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/fy2010_objectivesreport.pdf.  She explains that this would 
help reduce fraud as well as reduce the burden on taxpayers eligible for refundable credits 
whose claims might otherwise be frozen. Id. at xix–xxii. 
 21. See Lederman, supra note 1, at 697 & n.9. 
 22. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TAX COMPLIANCE:  MULTIPLE 
APPROACHES ARE NEEDED TO REDUCE THE TAX GAP 12 (2007) (“Information reporting tends 
to lead to high levels of compliance because income taxpayers earn is transparent to them 
and IRS.”); Cords, supra note 4, at 1544 (“Mandatory withholding and third-party 
information reporting eliminate the opportunity for most taxpayers to underreport their 
income without detection.”); Lederman, supra note 1, at 698 (“Information reporting and 
withholding extend to a variety of types of income in the U.S[.], and are highly successful at 
securing compliance.”). 
 23. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL 
PERSPECTIVES:  BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 194–95 
(2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/spec.pdf 
(“[Information reporting] is not possible in all cases and even where it is possible it might 
require burdensome new reporting requirements for individuals and businesses.  For 
example, individuals paying a contractor or purchasing a car might be required to file reports 
to the IRS reporting these transactions. Such broad expansions of reporting requirements 
would be excessively burdensome, and . . . this consideration outweighs the gains they might 
bring in increased compliance.”). 
 24. Cf. Lederman, supra note 1, at 725–26 (contrasting arm’s-length relationships with 
typical family relationships). 
 25. See id. at 729–30.  In theory, the employer could report lower wages on Form W-2 
than on its tax return, but that would increase the risk of detection via matching of the related 
returns. 
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 (2) Bookkeeping infrastructure.  Information reporting is more 
efficient when required of taxpayers, such as businesses, with a 
bookkeeping infrastructure than when required of individuals 
without such an infrastructure.26 
 (3) Centralization.  Information reporting is more efficient when 
required of parties who are fewer in number than the recipients of 
the reports, making auditing more centralized27 (assuming 
compliance with information reporting is reviewed on audit,28 as it 
should be).  Often, this goes hand-in-hand with item (2) 
(Bookkeeping infrastructure); businesses tend to be fewer in 
number than their customers or employees.29 
 (4) Complete reporting.  Information reporting is most effective 
when it provides all of the information necessary for the 
government to match the third-party report with corresponding 
amounts on the taxpayer’s return; partial reporting reduces 
enforcement efficiency.30  For example, Form W-2 provides wage 
and salary information that the IRS can directly match by computer 
with an employee’s return.  If an employee worked for multiple 
employers during the year, the IRS must aggregate the amounts on 
the Forms W-2, but it will still have all of the information 
necessary to perform the matching.31 
 (5) Few alternative arrangements.  To the extent the taxpayer 
has fewer ways to cheaply avoid an information reporting 
requirement, it will be more effective and result in fewer 
distortions.  For example, if an employer could avoid information 
reporting requirements by reclassifying employees as independent 
 
 26. Cf. Kyle D. Logue & Joel Slemrod, Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal Tax Liability 
1, 34 (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 09-004, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1335924 (explaining that economies of scale suggest that tax 
compliance costs are lower for larger tax remitters).  Code section 6041, for example, 
provides that “[a]ll persons engaged in a trade or business” who make certain payments 
aggregating $600 or more to one recipient must issue an information return. I.R.C. § 6041(a) 
(2006). 
 27. See Cheng, supra note 13, at 666 (pointing out the advantage of “regulat[ing] 
centralized institutions rather than individuals”); Logue & Slemrod, supra note 26, at 34 
(“Economies of scale to learning the tax laws, to gathering the relevant tax information, and 
to filing forms with the tax authorities, would suggest that bigger is better:  that larger 
taxpayers would present lower compliance costs per unit of tax remitted and collected.”). 
 28. See Bankman, supra note 10, at 512 (“[M]any auditors do not enforce the current 
reporting requirements.  One reason for this is that auditors naturally focus on whether a 
particular taxpayer has paid all of its tax liabilities.  Looking to see whether a taxpayer has 
met its reporting obligations is not an audit priority.”). 
 29. Cf. Cheng, supra note 13, at 666 (“Institutions, usually in the form of corporations, 
are easier to regulate because they are smaller in number, have known locations, and have 
significant economic incentives to comply with government mandates.”). 
 30. Cf. Bankman, supra note 10, at 512 (“It is not so easy to make use of 1099’s in 
business, where 1099’s account for only a fraction of gross sales.  A simple computer check 
will not reveal whether income has been underreported.”). 
 31. In other words, the IRS will have sufficient information to check that the amount 
reported as wages at least equals the total amounts reported on Forms W-2. 
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contractors (which it cannot under current law),32 that would 
increase the employer’s incentive both to claim that workers are 
independent contractors and to restructure working conditions so 
that workers fall within the independent contractor classification. 
 (6) Contributor to tax gap.  Information reporting is not efficient 
if the amount at stake is not substantial enough to justify the cost of 
information return issuance by payors and processing by the IRS.  
Thus, transactions of a type that do not contribute much to the tax 
gap in the absence of information reporting are not prime targets 
for information reporting. 
These structural principles allow systematic evaluation of three recently 
adopted information reporting requirements that have not yet become 
effective and of three proposals to extend information reporting to contexts 
in which it is not currently required.  After discussing the recently enacted 
requirement that brokers report basis in securities transactions, the 
following proposals and new laws are considered below:  eliminating the 
reporting exemption for electing small business corporations 
(S corporations) and other closely held corporations with respect to 
payments by businesses to service providers;33 requiring online auction 
sites, such as eBay, to provide information reports to sellers;34 requiring 
information reporting on consumer purchases, either by consumers or 
financial intermediaries;35 and requiring information reporting by recipients 
 
 32. Under current law, an information reporting requirement will still apply (assuming 
the dollar threshold is met). See I.R.C. § 6041A(a) (2006).  However, an employer can avoid 
withholding taxes if it successfully classifies the workers as independent contractors.  See id. 
§§ 3306, 3402; Treas. Reg. § 31.3306(i)-1 (1960). 
 33. See Bankman, supra note 10, at 511–12 (referring to “chang[ing] the reporting rules 
to include S corporations and closely held corporations”); see also Hearing on the Tax Gap 
Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and IRS Oversight of the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th 
Cong. 14 (2006) (statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate) [hereinafter 
Hearing on the Tax Gap], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/ntatestimonysfctax_
gap072606.pdf; Joseph Bankman, Tax Enforcement:  Tax Shelters, the Cash Economy, and 
Compliance Costs, 104 TAX NOTES 185, 189 (2004) (“[W]e might apply the reporting 
requirements to payments to S corporations as well as partnerships.”). 
 34. As discussed below, Congress recently enacted an information reporting requirement 
applicable to high-volume sellers. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-289, § 3091(e)(1), 122 Stat. 2654, 2911 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 3406 note).  
Section 6050W, which also contains requirements related to payment card transactions, is 
scheduled to apply to “calendar years beginning after December 31, 2010.” I.R.C. § 6050W 
(West Supp. 2009). 
 35. See, e.g., Joshua D. Rosenberg, Narrowing the Tax Gap:  Behavioral Options, 117 
TAX NOTES 517, 523–24 (2007) (proposing information reporting by consumers and financial 
institutions); see also DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2008 REVENUE PROPOSALS 66 (2007) [hereinafter GENERAL 
EXPLANATIONS], available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/bluebk07.pdf;  
1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 500–01 (2007) 
[hereinafter TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT], available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/arc_2007_vol_1_legislativerec.pdf.   Section II.D.2 of this 
Essay also discusses a recently enacted provision applicable in the payment card context. See 
I.R.C. § 6050W(a), (b)(1)(A). 
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of gifts in excess of the annual gift tax exclusion.36  The most promising 
areas for information reporting are discussed first. 
II.  EVALUATING INFORMATION REPORTING LAWS AND PROPOSALS 
A.  Basis Reporting in Securities Transactions 
In the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (the Act),37 
Congress required brokers to report basis in securities.38  The Act amends 
Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 6045 to require brokers who are 
already required to file information returns to “include the customer’s 
adjusted basis in such security and whether any gain or loss with respect to 
such security is long-term or short-term (within the meaning of section 
1222).”39  The amendment is scheduled to apply to securities acquired on or 
after January 1, 2011, at the earliest.40  A change along these lines had 
previously been proposed by scholars and policy makers.41 
 
 36. See Mitchell M. Gans & Jay A. Soled, Reforming the Gift Tax and Making It 
Enforceable, 87 B.U. L. REV. 759, 792–93 (2007). 
 37. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765. 
 38. Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 403, I.R.C. § 6045(g). 
 39. Id. § 403(a)(1), I.R.C. § 6045(g)(2).  Code section 1222 defines long-term and short-
term capital gain. See I.R.C. § 1222(1), (3) (2006).   Failure to comply with the information 
reporting requirements will be subject to penalties.  The Preamble to proposed regulations 
issued in December 2009 explains, 
The Act amended the list of returns and statements in section 6724(d) for which 
sections 6721 and 6722 impose penalties for any failure to file or furnish complete 
and correct returns and statements.  This section imposes a penalty on brokers for a 
failure to file returns or furnish complete and correct statements after a sale of 
securities as required by section 6045.  Section 6724(d) now also imposes 
penalties with respect to the returns and statements required by sections 6045A and 
6045B. 
Information Reporting for Payments Made in Settlement of Payment Card and Third 
Party Network Transactions, 74 Fed. Reg. 67,010, 67,012 (Dec. 17, 2009) [hereinafter 
December 2009 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking], reprinted in 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 240-
14. 
 40. See I.R.C. § 6045(g)(2) (applying reporting of basis information in a “covered 
security”); id. § 6045(g)(3)(A) (defining “covered security” as “any specified security 
acquired on or after the applicable date” if certain requirements are met); id. § 6045(g)(3)(C) 
(providing applicable dates of January 1, 2011, for most stock; January 1, 2012, for certain 
stock; and “January 1, 2013, or such later date determined by the Secretary in the case of any 
other specified security”).  The Preamble to the proposed Treasury regulations explains, 
For stock in a RIC [Regulated Investment Company] . . . or stock acquired in 
connection with a DRP [Dividend Reinvestment Plan] . . . section 
6045(g)(3)(C)(ii) provides that the applicable date is January 1, 2012.  For any 
other specified security, section 6045(g)(3)(C)(iii) provides that the applicable date 
is January 1, 2013, or a later date determined by the Secretary.  The reporting rules 
related to options transactions apply only to options granted or acquired on or after 
January 1, 2013, as provided in section 6045(h)(3). 
December 2009 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 39, at 67,011. 
 41. See GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 64; 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV.,  
2005 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 437 (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/section_2.pdf; Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth Under the 
Income Tax, 81 IND. L.J. 539, 582–97 (2006) [hereinafter Dodge & Soled, Debunking the 
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Brokers already were required to produce information reports containing 
the sales price of a security, and, in addition, they often had the purchase 
price information because they served as the broker on the purchase.42  
Thus, the new law generally will enable information reporting on securities 
sales to move from partial reporting to more comprehensive reporting, in 
line with item (4) (Complete reporting), above.43  The cost to brokers of 
adding that item should be relatively small, given that many of them tracked 
gains and losses anyway,44 and they were already required to make 
information reports.  Brokers typically act at arm’s length with their 
customers, they are businesses, and they are fewer in number and generally 
more sophisticated in the relevant calculations than their customers.45  
Moreover, noncompliance by taxpayers on their securities transactions was 
alleged to be substantial.46  Accordingly, this change will likely prove to be 
 
Basis Myth]; Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Reporting Tax Basis:  Dawn of a New Era, 
110 TAX NOTES 784, 784 (2006). 
 42. Dodge & Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth, supra note 41, at 584.  When it enacted 
the basis reporting requirement, Congress also added Code section 6045A. See Pub. L. No. 
110-343, § 403(c)(1), 122 Stat. at 3858.  That section requires 
[e]very applicable person which transfers to a broker (as defined in section 
6045(c)(1)) a security which is a covered security (as defined in section 
6045(g)(3)) in the hands of such applicable person [to] furnish to such broker a 
written statement . . . for purposes of enabling such broker to meet the 
requirements of section 6045(g). 
I.R.C. § 6045A(a).  By statute, a broker is an “applicable person.” Id. § 6045A(b)(1).  
Proposed regulations issued in December 2009 provide that the term applicable person also 
includes “any person that acts as a custodian of securities in the ordinary course of a trade or 
business, any issuer of securities, and any agent of these persons.” Prop. Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.6045A-1(a)(3), 74 Fed. Reg. 67,010, 67,021 (Dec. 17, 2009) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 
pt. 1).  These provisions are designed to limit the ability of a taxpayer subject to the 
reporting requirement to avoid the requirement by having securities transferred to another 
broker. 
 43. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 44. Dodge & Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth, supra note 41, at 584–85. 
 45. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS 
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET PROPOSAL 145 (Comm. Print 
2008) [hereinafter J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 2009 BUDGET PROPOSAL], available at 
http://www.house.gov/jct/s-1-08.pdf. 
 46. The Treasury Department estimated that the proposed change would raise $6.7 
billion from 2008 through 2017. GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 64; cf. The 
Causes of and Solutions to the Federal Tax Gap Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, 109th 
Cong. 4–5 (2006) (statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate) [hereinafter 
Causes and Solutions], available at http://budget.senate.gov/democratic/testimony/
2006/olsen_taxgap021506.pdf  (“Reliable estimates of the amount of underreporting in this 
area are difficult to come by, but two professors have sized the problem at about $25 billion 
a year.  IRS officials studying the NRP data believe the revenue loss is substantially lower, 
but they agree that the level of underreporting reaches into the billions of dollars.” (citing 
Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Inflated Tax Basis and the Quarter-Trillion-Dollar 
Revenue Question, 106 TAX NOTES 453 (2005))).  Nina Olson noted that “Treasury’s 
proposal would not take effect until 2009, and it would only require basis reporting with 
regard to securities purchased after that date.  In the early years, many securities sold would 
have been purchased prior to the effective date of the proposal and thus would be exempt 
from reporting.” The IRS and the Tax Gap Before the H. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 
5 n.10 (2007) (statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate) [hereinafter The 
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a valuable one.  It also has the benefit of being helpful to honest taxpayers 
by reducing the burden of tracking basis information.47 
A conceivable drawback of the new provision is the possibility of 
investor migration away from securities for which basis reporting is 
required and into investments where basis reporting is not required.48  
Treasury regulations that maintain the applicability of the requirement to a 
broad set of securities will limit the ability of taxpayers to shift to 
substantially similar, but less transparent, investments.49 
B.  Eliminating Exceptions for Payments for Services 
Provided by Small Corporations 
Just as employers must issue information reports with respect to their 
employees (on Form W-2), those who use the services of independent 
contractors generally must issue reports with respect to those service 
 
IRS and the Tax Gap], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/nta_housebudget_
testimony_021607.pdf. 
 47. See Dodge & Soled, Debunking the Basis Myth, supra note 41, at 584 (“A gain and 
loss reporting system would make things easier for taxpayers, who would not have to keep 
track of basis at all in the case of financial assets acquired and housed with a broker.”).  Nina 
Olson explains, 
To illustrate, a taxpayer who has held AT&T stock since the 1980s has received 
shares in more than a dozen companies over the years, and on each such occasion, 
the taxpayer’s cost basis had to be split between his existing holding and the spun-
off company.  Similarly, most mutual fund customers elect to have dividend and 
capital gain distributions automatically reinvested, and the customer’s aggregate 
basis in a mutual fund holding changes upon each such distribution.  If taxpayers 
don’t have complete records, they will be unable to determine or substantiate their 
basis in many instances.  We recommended requiring brokers to track and report 
cost basis primarily because it would make life much easier for honest taxpayers. 
Causes and Solutions, supra note 46, at 5. 
 48. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 2009 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 45, at 145. 
 49. See id. (“[T]he likelihood of distortions will depend in part on the breadth of the 
rules ultimately provided in Treasury regulations defining the types of securities that are 
subject to the proposal.”).  The legislation applies the new provisions to the following: 
(i) any share of stock in a corporation, 
(ii) any note, bond, debenture, or other evidence of indebtedness, 
(iii) any commodity, or contract or derivative with respect to such commodity, if 
the Secretary determines that adjusted basis reporting is appropriate for purposes 
of this subsection, and 
(iv) any other financial instrument with respect to which the Secretary determines 
that adjusted basis reporting is appropriate for purposes of this subsection. 
I.R.C. § 6045(g)(3)(B) (West Supp. 2009) (effective Jan. 1, 2011, Jan. 1, 2012, and Jan. 1, 
2013).  Proposed regulations issued in December 2009 apply the reporting requirement to 
any “specified security” acquired in a sale transaction or for which the broker received a 
transfer statement stating that the security is subject to the reporting requirements; “[s]tock 
in a regulated investment company if acquired through a sale transaction in an account on or 
after January 1, 2012”; and “[s]tock acquired in connection with a dividend reinvestment 
plan if acquired through a sale transaction in an account on or after January 1, 2012.” Prop. 
Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(a)(15)(ii)–(iii), 74 Fed. Reg. 67,010, 67,030 (Dec. 17, 2009) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).  The proposed regulations limit the term “specified security” to 
stock, see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(a)(14), 74 Fed. Reg. at 67,030, but the Preamble 
states that options and debt instruments “are expected to be addressed in future guidance.” 
December 2009 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 39, at 67,013. 
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providers (on Form 1099).  Code section 6041A contains an information 
reporting requirement applicable to “any service-recipient engaged in a 
trade or business [who] pays in the course of such trade or business during 
any calendar year remuneration to any person for services performed by 
such person, . . . [if] the aggregate of such remuneration paid to such person 
during such calendar year is $600 or more.”50  However, the Treasury 
Department has long exempted by regulation51 most domestic and foreign 
corporate payees.52  The scope of the exemption includes both electing 
small business corporations (S corporations) and other corporations 
(C corporations).53 
The exclusion raises compliance concerns for two connected reasons.  
First, it eliminates information reporting for amounts received by corporate 
payees, including small ones.  Small businesses are the largest contributors 
to the tax gap.54  Second, incorporation is available as a strategic option for 
small businesses.55  Individuals inclined to evade taxes may therefore form 
a wholly owned corporation simply to avoid receiving information 
reports.56 
 
 50. I.R.C. § 6041A(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 51. Cf. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 495 n.26 
(“Although the corporate exception could be changed by regulation, because it has been in 
place for many years during which Congress has made changes to the information reporting 
rules, the Treasury Department believes the corporate exception should be eliminated 
through legislation.” (citing GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 63)). 
 52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3 (as amended in 2000) (“Returns of information are not 
required under section 6041 and §§ 1.6041-1 and 1.6041-2 for payments described in 
paragraphs (a) through (q) of this section.”); id. § 1.6041-3(p)(1) (as amended in 2006)  (“[a] 
corporation described in § 1.6049-4(c)(1)(ii)(A),” subject to limited exceptions); id. 
§ 1.6049-4(c)(1)(ii)(A) (as amended in 2006) (“A corporation, as defined in section 
7701(a)(3), whether domestic or foreign, is an exempt recipient.”).  Note that under Code 
section 6041A(d)(3), notwithstanding the regulations, information reporting does apply to 
payments to corporations made by federal executive agencies. 
 53. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (defining “[t]he term ‘corporation’ [to] include[] 
associations, joint-stock companies, and insurance companies” and not distinguishing 
between S corporations and C corporations); see also id. § 1361(a) (defining both C and S 
corporations as types of corporations). 
 54. See generally TAX YEAR 2001, supra note 10; see also TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 
2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 490 & n.4 (“Although the IRS does not estimate the 
portion of the tax gap attributable to the so called ‘cash economy,’ unreported income from 
the cash economy is probably the single largest component of the tax gap, likely accounting 
for over $100 billion per year.”).  Some countries use withholding by payors or “reverse 
withholding” systems (withholding by payees) to promote tax compliance by small 
businesses. See Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding:  A Comparative 
Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 107, 131, 143–45 (1990).  These 
systems are beyond the scope of this Essay. 
 55. IRS Official’s Testimony at House Hearing on Employment Taxes:  Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs of the H. Comm. on 
Government Operations, 103d Cong. (1993) (statement of Marshall V. Washburn, 
Compliance 2000 Executive, I.R.S.), reprinted in 93 TAX NOTES TODAY 122-37 (“Currently 
payors are required to report service payments made to non-corporate entities, but not those 
made to corporations.  This exemption may be a significant reason why voluntary 
compliance for small corporations is low.”). 
 56. See id. (“There are indications that some independent contractors incorporate or 
claim to be incorporated to avoid information reporting.”); cf. The IRS and the Tax Gap, 
LEDERMAN_10_03_01POSBP_PAGINATED 3/2/2010  10:49 AM 
1746 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
Nina Olson, the National Taxpayer Advocate, has explained, 
One possible justification for the corporate exception to the information 
reporting requirements is that large corporations are less likely to 
underreport income than sole proprietors because they must account to 
unrelated shareholders for business earnings and expenses.  The same 
reports and accounting systems used to account to shareholders can be 
audited by the IRS, reducing the temptation to understate income.  
However, these safeguards may not be present in many closely-held 
corporations.57 
In addition, the corporate exception requires payors to determine whether 
the payee is an individual or a corporation, which adds some compliance 
cost.58 
Several tax experts, including Olson and Professor Joseph Bankman, 
have proposed eliminating this exception.59  Estimates of the revenue that 
could be raised by this proposal over a ten-year period range from $6.8 
billion to $7.7 billion.60 
The principal drawback of this proposal is its compliance cost for payors.  
An advocate for small businesses explained that some business might be 
new to the Form 1099 filing system, and those already filing 1099 Forms 
would face increased burdens.61  However, a recent Government 
 
supra note 46, at 5 (statement of Nina E. Olson) (“There are, of course, many valid reasons 
for choosing to conduct business as a corporation, but information-reporting avoidance 
should not be such a reason.”). 
 57. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 495. 
 58. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 2009 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 45, at 141. 
 59. See Hearing on the Tax Gap, supra note 33, at 14 (statement of Nina E. Olson) (“For 
Form 1099-MISC information reporting purposes, I believe there should be no distinction 
between taxpayers providing the same services for compensation merely because one 
taxpayer has incorporated and another has not.”); TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2007 
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 495 (recommending that “[i]f the IRS’s National 
Research Program (NRP) shows significant levels of noncompliance among small 
corporations, [Congress should] reiterate and clarify the IRS’s authority to require third-
party information reporting for applicable payments (aggregating to $600 or more) to 
independent contractors who are operating as corporations”); Bankman, supra note 10, at 
511 (referring to “chang[ing] the reporting rules to include S corporations and closely held 
corporations”); Bankman, supra note 33, at 189; see also Taxpayer Responsibility, 
Accountability, and Consistency Act of 2008, H.R. 5804, 110th Cong. § 2 (2008); Jay A. 
Soled, Homage to Information Returns, 27 VA. TAX REV. 371, 385 (2007) (“Under current 
law, recipients of paid-for services must issue information returns . . . to individual service 
providers if the aggregate value of such services for any calendar year exceeds $600.  This 
same requirement does not apply if the service provider in question is a corporate entity.  On 
its face, this appears to be a silly distinction.” (citing I.R.C. § 6041A(a); Treas. Reg. 
§§ 1.6041-3(p)(1), 1.6049-4(c)(1)(ii)(A) (as amended in 2006))). 
 60. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 2009 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 45, at 313 
(estimating $6.8 billion for 2008–2018, with 2008 treated as before the effective date and 
estimated at zero); GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 63. 
 61. Closing the Tax Gap Without Creating Burdens for Small Businesses:  Hearing 
Before the H. Small Business Comm., 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Paul Hense, Hense 
and Associates, on Behalf of the National Small Business Association) [hereinafter Closing 
the Tax Gap], available at http://www.nsba.biz/docs/hense_testimony_4-25-07_final.pdf. 
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Accountability Office study suggests that the cost to small businesses of 
producing information returns is low: 
In our nine case studies, filers of information returns told us that existing 
information return costs, both in-house and for external payments, were 
relatively low. . . . One small business employing under five people told 
us of possibly spending 3 to 5 hours per year filing Form 1099 
information returns manually, using an accounting package to gather the 
information. . . . Two external parties reported prices for preparing and 
filing Forms 1099 with IRS of about $10 per form for 5 forms to about $2 
per form for 100 forms, with one of them charging about $.80 per form 
for 100,000 forms.62 
It is also theoretically possible to exempt from the requirement payments 
by certain payors (such as the smallest ones) or to certain payees (such as 
very large corporations, which are already highly regulated).63  
Accordingly, the National Taxpayer Advocate has proposed, 
Congress should direct the IRS to waive the requirement for those 
corporations willing to certify they have had a large number of 
shareholders (e.g., 50 or more shareholders), at any time in the prior 
calendar year (or prior 12-month period).  IRS Form W-9 could be revised 
to include a check box for the corporation to indicate if it had the requisite 
number shareholders at any time in the prior calendar year (or prior 12-
month period).64 
The waiver proposal may reflect the fact that an outright exemption can add 
complexity and gaming opportunities. 
This proposal is promising under the six factors developed above.  It 
involves situations in which the parties (service recipient and service 
provider) generally act at arm’s length.  In addition, because the 
requirement relates to the performance of services to businesses, the payor 
generally would be able to deduct the payment, which reduces the 
possibility of collusion between payor and payee to underreport. 
Furthermore, the proposal would not expand payor information reporting 
beyond businesses.  The payors also will generally be fewer in number than 
the payees, with the possible exception of situations in which a small 
business spends substantial amounts on the services of several vendors, 
including large providers such as Federal Express.65  However, a waiver for 
large corporate payees would address much of that issue.  The proposal 
would also reach an important area of noncompliance—underreporting by 
 
 62. GAO, COSTS AND USES, supra note 20, at 3. 
 63. Small business advocate Paul Hense argues, “[i]n practicality, this [information 
reporting proposal] means that every time a small-business owner ships a package with 
Federal Express or uses some other service, and the expenses total more than $600 by year-
end, they would need to keep the receipts, prepare a Form 1099 and file them not only with 
the IRS, but with Federal Express and any other companies as well.” Closing the Tax Gap, 
supra note 61, at 3 (statement of Paul Hense). 
 64. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 495–96. 
 65. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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small businesses.66  Finally, the proposal would reduce the distortion that 
results from incorporation undertaken to avoid information reporting.67 
As with 1099 Forms provided to individuals who perform services, a 
Form 1099 provided to a corporate payee would provide all of the 
information necessary for the government to match the report with an 
amount on the taxpayer’s return (though, as with individuals who work for 
multiple payors, the IRS would have to aggregate the amounts reported).  
One difficulty that corporations introduce in this regard is that many of 
them may not be required to report the income in the same calendar year in 
which a 1099 is issued because they are fiscal year taxpayers and/or are on 
the accrual method.68  The IRS would therefore need to consider multiple 
years in some cases in order to perform adequate return matching. 
Nonetheless, information reporting to corporate payees holds promise.  It 
should have some deterrent effect and reduce strategic incorporations by 
sole proprietors.  It would also be a very useful tool for an audit, as the 
returns would contain the information necessary to match reported income, 
at least once multiple years were examined. 
C.  Reporting of Sales on eBay and Other Online Auction Sites 
“Yahoo, eBay, and other Internet auction sites allow millions of people to 
sell their products either as a hobby or as an actual business.”69  These sites 
do tremendous amounts of business; sales were projected to be $48.5 billion 
for 2006.70  “One industry spokesperson has estimated that more than 
430,000 people generate most of their incomes selling on just the major 
Internet auction site.”71  
Given that many individual transactions involve small dollar amounts, 
enforcement is a difficult task for the IRS.72  Not surprisingly, many online 
sellers likely do not report their earnings from these sales to the IRS.73  Yet, 
auction sites need to track the sales in order to collect their fees.  For 
example, eBay typically charges the seller a fee for listing an item and an 
additional fee if the item sells.74  In effect, eBay acts as a middleman or 
broker in the sales that occur on its site. 
 
 66. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (contribution of small businesses to the tax 
gap); supra note 60 and accompanying text (revenue estimates of proposal). 
 67. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. 
 68. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 2009 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 45, at 140–41. 
 69. Richard Malamud, How the IRS Can Close the Online Auction Tax Gap, 106 TAX 
NOTES 110, 110 (2005) (footnote omitted); see eBay, www.ebay.com (last visited Feb. 9, 
2010); Yahoo! Shopping, http://shopping.yahoo.com (last visited Feb. 9, 2010). 
 70. Malamud, supra note 69, at 110–11. 
 71. Id. at 111. 
 72. Susan Albring, Lillian F. Mills & Marlene Plumlee, Beanie Baby Billions? Unpaid 
Taxes on Internet Auctions, 87 TAX NOTES 1153, 1158 (2000). 
 73. See id. at 1153 (estimating in 2000 “that uncollected capital gain taxes are in the 
hundreds of millions of dollars from eBay collectibles alone”). 
 74. See eBay.com Fees, http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html (last visited Feb. 9, 
2010). 
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Brokers are required to file information returns.75  The Code defines the 
term “broker” as “(A) a dealer, (B) a barter exchange, and (C) any other 
person who (for a consideration) regularly acts as a middleman with respect 
to property or services.”76  The definition sounds like it could include sites 
such as eBay, which “regularly acts as a middleman” in numerous sales 
transactions.77  However, Treasury regulations essentially limit the 
application of section 6045 to securities brokers.78  In addition, the 
regulations provide that “[t]he following persons are not brokers . . . in the 
absence of additional facts that indicate the person is a broker: . . . A person 
(such as a stock exchange) that merely provides facilities in which others 
effect sales.”79  Internet auction sites such as eBay arguably fall within this 
regulatory exception.80 
Before Congress enacted Code section 6050W, discussed below, there 
were several proposals to extend information reporting to online auction 
sites.81  One proposal, for example, was as follows: 
 
 75. I.R.C. § 6045(a) (2006).  Note that “section 6041 . . . requires a business to file Form 
1099 if it pays more than $600 for services to one person during the year.  Reporting is not 
required if the payment is for products.  Because consignment and Internet sellers sell 
products rather than services, section 6041 doesn’t appear to apply to them.” Malamud, 
supra note 69, at 112 (footnote omitted). 
 76. I.R.C. § 6045(c)(1). 
 77. See Malamud, supra note 69, at 113 (concluding, after analysis, that “[i]t . . . appears 
that all the elements necessary to conclude that Internet middlem[en] and brick-and-mortar 
consignment sellers are brokers as defined in section 6045 are met and that accordingly, if 
‘required by the Secretary,’ they must furnish a Form 1099 reporting the gross sales of their 
customers to the IRS”). 
 78. See id. (“According to the regulations, a business can be a broker only if it effects 
sales, and it effects sales only if what it sells are:  securities, commodities, regulated futures 
contracts, or forward contracts for cash.”); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(a)(1) (as 
amended in 2006) (defining broker to require “stand[ing] ready to effect sales to be made by 
others”); id. § 1.6045-1(a)(9) (“The term sale means any disposition of securities, 
commodities, regulated futures contracts, or forward contracts for cash, and includes 
redemptions of stock, retirements of indebtedness, and enterings into short sales.”). 
 79. Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1(b) ex. 2(ii).  In addition, the term “customer” is defined 
narrowly, generally requiring that, to be a customer, the broker must act as an agent for that 
person, as a principal, or as “[t]he participant in the sale responsible for paying to such 
person or crediting to such person’s account the gross proceeds on the sale.” Id. § 1.6045-
1(a)(2)(iii).  Internet auction sites do not always act in any of these capacities. See GENERAL 
EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 65 (“[E]xisting law does not clearly impose the information 
return requirement on businesses that, with respect to sales of tangible personal property, 
may not be acting as agents of the customers (i.e., the sellers of the property).”).  However, 
they sometimes collect the sales proceeds and remit them to the seller. See Malamud, supra 
note 69, at 114. 
 80. See Malamud, supra note 69, at 113 (“[T]he regulations define ‘brokers’ in such a 
restrictive manner that they do not include Internet auctioneers and traditional consignment 
sellers.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Hearing on the Tax Gap, supra note 33, at 14–15 (statement of Nina E. 
Olson); GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 65.  Other countries have made specific 
requests to eBay for information about high-dollar sellers. See, e.g., Paul Waldie, EBay Loses Bid 
To Shield Sellers from Taxman, GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada), Apr. 29, 2008, at B1, available 
at http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080429.wrebay29/
BNStory/Business/ (“The Federal Court of Appeal has upheld a lower court ruling and 
ordered eBay Canada Ltd. to comply with a request from the Canada Revenue Agency to 
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The requirement would apply only with respect to a customer for whom 
the broker has handled 100 or more separate transactions generating at 
least $5,000 in gross proceeds in a year.  There would be an exception 
from the proposed requirement (and the sale would not be taken into 
account for the 100 transactions/$5,000 gross proceeds test) if the sale is 
required to be reported by other information return requirements (such as 
payment card sales the gross proceeds of which would be reported under 
the payment card reporting proposal).  The IRS and Treasury Department 
would have regulatory authority to allow additional exceptions in 
appropriate situations in which the benefit of information reporting is 
outweighed by the cost of compliance.82 
Because, unlike securities brokers, auction sites typically will not know a 
customer’s basis (because often they were not used to acquire the property), 
such information reporting would likely need to encompass only the gross 
proceeds.  This is one reason why the proposal appropriately contains a 
threshold much higher than the $600 threshold for reporting the services of 
independent contractors, for example.83  Another, related, reason is that 
“[r]eporting personal rather than business sales could cause extensive 
reporting by taxpayers who are simply selling a few items from home, sort 
of as an online garage sale.”84  Moreover, “most items sold at a garage sale 
actually result in . . . personal, nondeductible losses.”85 
As indicated above, Congress recently enacted Code section 6050W, 
which, in addition to requiring information reporting with respect to certain 
transactions by credit or debit card,86 requires every “third party settlement 
organization,”87 including auction sites such as eBay,88 to issue an 
information report containing the name, address, and taxpayer identification 
number of each “participating payee”89 who engaged in over two hundred 
 
produce the names, addresses, phone numbers, e-mail addresses as well as gross sales figures 
for all Canadian PowerSellers.  The PowerSeller program applies to people who sell at least 
$1,000 (U.S.) a month through the site.”); The World Today:  Online Sellers Targeted by Tax 
Office (ABC radio broadcast Mar. 13, 2007), available at http://www.abc.net.au/
worldtoday/content/2007/s1870847.htm (“[E]Bay is just one of a number of online auction 
sites being asked by the [Australian] tax office to provide details of sellers turning a profit of 
more than $50,000 a year.”). 
 82. GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 65.  The proposal was estimated to raise 
$1.97 billion from 2008–2017. Id. 
 83. See I.R.C. § 6041A(a)(2) (2006). 
 84. See Malamud, supra note 69, at 115 (“[A] good starting point might be mandatory 
reporting if there are more than 50 sales per year and at least $2,000 of sales per year.  Thus, 
a single car, even sold at $15,000, would not require reporting and neither would 100 sales 
of CDs at $11 each, unless both occurred in the same year.”). 
 85. Id.  A sale of an item for less than its basis results in a realized loss. See 
I.R.C. § 1001(a).  A loss on the sale of a personal-use item generally is not recognized for 
tax purposes. See id. § 165(c). 
 86. This aspect of Code section 6050W is discussed below. See infra notes 103–24 and 
accompanying text. 
 87. I.R.C. § 6050W(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2009). 
 88. Jeremiah Coder, Securities Basis Reporting Is a Step Toward Use of Technology, 
122 TAX NOTES 840, 841 (2009). 
 89. In general, a “participating payee” is “in the case of a payment card transaction, any 
person who accepts a payment card as payment, and . . . in the case of a third party network 
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transactions during the year if the payments aggregate over $20,000.90  The 
new law is scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2011.91 
This new information reporting requirement has both benefits and 
drawbacks under the criteria provided above.  On the plus side, it involves 
parties who are generally at arm’s length.  It also calls for entities such as 
eBay, not individuals, to make information reports, providing the advantage 
of centralization—one middleman would make reports to many sellers. 
The principal disadvantage to this requirement under the above criteria is 
that these information reports will not—and cannot—provide all of the 
information necessary for the government to match the report with the 
amount on the taxpayer’s return, because the reporting entity generally has 
no reliable way of knowing the taxpayer’s basis in the property sold.  The 
reporting requirement therefore essentially makes information reporting for 
sellers equivalent to what information reporting was for securities before 
the recent amendment requiring the inclusion of basis information.92  It will 
not provide for the easy matching that Form W-2 does with respect to 
employees’ wages, for example, because an eBay seller’s basis in the 
property sold would not be verifiable without an audit.93 
Another limitation of the proposal is that it will likely apply to relatively 
few sellers.  Given that it applies only to sellers who have both more than 
two hundred transactions during the calendar year and receive in excess of 
$20,000 of sales proceeds during that year, it generally will not apply to 
casual sellers.  In addition, sellers who do a higher volume of business may 
be able to use self-help to limit the effectiveness of the reporting 
requirement.  One ploy might be to divide up auction listings among 
multiple accounts, with some accounts registered in the name of the seller’s 
spouse or children, so as to avoid the reporting threshold.94  Another 
possibility would be to divide up sales among online auction sites, for the 
same reason.  The inconvenience of learning multiple systems and tracking 
items on several sites should reduce but not eliminate the latter strategy.95 
 
transaction, any person who accepts payment from a third party settlement organization in 
settlement of such transaction,” except that it will not include “any person with a foreign 
address” except as provided by the Secretary of the Treasury. I.R.C. § 6050W(d)(1). 
 90. Id. § 6050W(a), (e). 
 91. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3091(e)(1), 
122 Stat. 2654, 2853 (“Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the amendments 
made by this section shall apply to returns for calendar years beginning after December 31, 
2010.”). 
 92. See supra text accompanying notes 37–41. 
 93. This is also not a situation in which the payor generally can deduct the payments 
made, which would reduce the possibility of collusion. EBay purchases will often entail non-
deductible personal or capital expenditures. See I.R.C. §§ 262, 263 (2006). 
 94. I am grateful to Kristen Fowler for suggesting this ploy. 
 95. Some sellers might also avoid auction sites and use venues such as garage sales, 
Craigslist, and the like.  However, those venues are not close substitutes for auction sites, 
particularly for sellers with the volume of goods that will be subject to the requirement. 
Craigslist, http://www.craigslist.org (last visited Feb. 9, 2010), is not an auction site; it 
simply allows users to advertise items for sale.  Craigslist would therefore not be subject to 
information reporting applicable to online auction sites.  That makes sense because, unlike 
LEDERMAN_10_03_01POSBP_PAGINATED 3/2/2010  10:49 AM 
1752 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
In sum, this new law has its limitations, but it will likely increase 
compliance by some high-volume sellers,96 particularly those who purchase 
their inventory online, because basis for those sellers is easier to track.  If 
some of these sellers currently do not file tax returns, it might increase 
filing compliance, which could have positive spillover effects.  On balance, 
particularly given its high threshold, this law holds some, though somewhat 
limited, promise. 
D.  Information Reporting in Consumer Transactions 
As indicated above, one of the most difficult enforcement areas in the 
federal income tax relates to small businesses.  Cash-based retailers have 
significant opportunities to evade taxation, and they thus pose a substantial 
enforcement problem.  Several information reporting proposals have been 
floated that try to address this problem.  This section discusses the prospect 
of information reporting (1) by consumers, and (2) by financial 
intermediaries, which Congress recently required, effective in 2011. 
1.  Reporting by Consumers 
Professor Joshua Rosenberg has suggested the possibility that consumers 
file information returns on their retail purchases: 
Perhaps the most obvious way to increase reporting of payments for 
consumer goods and services would simply be to require such reporting 
by the consumers.  Because of the recordkeeping and other costs 
associated with reporting consumer purchases, even the most draconian 
reporting requirements would need to exclude some de minimis amounts.  
Of more importance, though, is the fact that merely “requiring” such 
reporting does not ensure that it will occur.  Unless the reporter has some 
incentive to make the required report and/or some more realistic potential 
penalty for not making the report, simply requiring reporting is likely to 
do little.97 
As Professor Rosenberg’s discussion indicates, information reporting by 
consumers poses several problems.  The six factors listed in Part I of this 
Essay98 highlight several issues.  First, cash retail transactions, although 
typically involving arm’s-length parties, pose the prospect of collusion, 
particularly given the fact that the consumer has little incentive to report the 
purchase.  Note that the consumer is unlikely to be eligible for a deduction 
 
eBay, Craigslist does not have a method for identifying when the seller has found a buyer for 
an item, and at what price. 
 96. IRS statistics show that items subject to partial information reporting have the rather 
high voluntary compliance rate of 91.4%. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 97. Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 523–24 (footnotes omitted); see also Bankman, supra 
note 10, at 512 (“Greg Jenner has suggested we might extend the reporting requirements to 
consumers. . . . Greg Jenner’s suggestion was informal—an idea to be considered rather than 
a fleshed-out proposal.”). 
 98. See supra text accompanying notes 23–32. 
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for items purchased; personal expenditures generally are nondeductible.99  
Second, the proposal would require individual taxpayers, who generally 
lack a bookkeeping infrastructure, to issue the reports.100  Third, the 
proposal would result in inefficient decentralization, as many consumers 
would be required to make reports on a single retailer.101  If the proposal 
were even partly effective, the IRS would therefore receive a high volume 
of reports on each retailer that it would need to process and aggregate.  This 
proposal, therefore, is inefficient, and likely would not substantially 
increase compliance. 
A creative alternative used in some countries is to have consumers’ 
receipts double as lottery tickets.102  That gives consumers an incentive 
both to request a receipt and to report the transaction to the government.  It 
removes much of the burden that information reporting would place on 
consumers, but does not overcome the disadvantage of decentralized 
reporting; it leaves the government with the burden of aggregating the 
receipts if it wishes to make use of them in the audit process. 
2.  Reporting by Financial Intermediaries in Consumer Transactions 
An alternative to requiring reporting by consumers themselves is 
reporting by financial intermediaries—the banks who process purchases by 
credit card, debit card, and check.  Recently enacted Code section 6050W, 
effective January 1, 2011,103 which was discussed above in connection with 
 
 99. I.R.C. § 262 (2006). 
 100. See Bankman, supra note 10, at 512 (explaining that requiring consumers to report 
payment to service providers aggregating over $600 in a single tax year “would in fact 
increase substantially the current record keeping burden associated with filing.  There would 
often be many more items to report and the task of keeping track of each item would be more 
difficult”).  There might be opposition for this reason: 
In Australia, for example, consumers in the past were required to report payments 
made to contractors for home improvements that exceed $10,000 (Australian).  
That requirement, while seemingly quite modest and sensible, was dropped in face 
of consumer opposition, and the experience in administering that law has 
discouraged the government from adopting similar reporting obligations. 
Id. at 509 (citing AUSTL. TAX OFFICE, THE CASH ECONOMY UNDER THE NEW TAX SYSTEM 
31–32 (2003), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/ATOpubs/cash%20economy.pdf). 
 101. Cf. Causes and Solutions, supra note 46, at 4 (statement of Nina E. Olson) 
(“[R]equiring everyone making a taxable payment to file a report with the government 
would impose more burden than most of us would be willing to bear.  No one wants to be 
obligated to file a document with the IRS every time he or she takes a cab ride, has someone 
mow their lawn, or calls a plumber to fix a broken faucet.”). 
 102. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005:  A BETTER 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 110 (2005), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/complete_report.pdf 
(describing such a program in China); Marla Dickerson, Get Rich by Paying Taxes, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, at A1 (mentioning similar programs in Chile and Costa Rica); Nirmal 
Sandhu, A Lottery Lesson from Thailand, TRIB. (India), May 19, 2003, 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030519/biz.htm#2 (“The government in Thailand now 
offers a handsome prize of $7,000 each week to 11 winners, who scribble their names on the 
back of the receipts and send them to the Finance Ministry.”). 
 103. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3091(e), 122 
Stat. 2654, 2911. 
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online auction sites, also requires every “payment settlement entity,” such 
as the bank that issued a credit card,104 to issue information reports.105  
Those reports must contain the name, address, and taxpayer identification 
number of each payee to whom the entity makes one or more reportable 
payments (such as in settlement of credit card transactions),106 as well as 
the gross amount of these payments.107 
The rationale for the new provision is as follows: 
The Committee believes that requiring information reporting with respect 
to receipts from credit card and other electronic payment transactions will 
improve compliance and IRS enforcement efforts.  Generally, business 
receipts that are subject to information reporting are less likely to be 
underreported by taxpayers.  The Committee believes that expanding 
information reporting requirements will encourage the filing of timely and 
accurate income tax returns and improve overall tax administration.108 
Of course, reporting by payment card companies does not capture cash 
purchases.109  The government could subsidize credit card purchases in 
order to encourage their use.110  However, 
[m]erchants would have an incentive not to pass the subsidy on, and to 
otherwise discourage debit or credit card use—at least from those 
 
 104. I.R.C. § 6050W(b)(1), (2) (West Supp. 2009). 
 105. Id. § 6050W(a).  The Treasury Department reported that “[s]everal commenters 
requested that the exception for de minimis payments [of 200 or fewer transactions during 
the year or $20,000 or less in payments, applicable to third-party settlement organizations 
such as eBay] be extended to include payments in settlement of payment card transactions.” 
Information Reporting for Payments Made in Settlement of Payment Card and Third Party 
Network Transactions, 74 Fed. Reg. 61,294, 61,295 (Nov. 24, 2009) [hereinafter November 
2009 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking], reprinted in 2009 TAX NOTES TODAY 224-10.  
However, “proposed regulations [issued on November 23, 2009] do not adopt this 
suggestion.” Id. 
 106. I.R.C. § 6050W(c). 
 107. Id. § 6050W(a).  Consumers may raise privacy concerns about the new provision.  
However, because it calls for reporting of the aggregate amounts of payments to retailers—
not customer-by-customer reporting (which is not needed to enforce the tax laws against the 
retailers)—privacy intrusions should be minimal. 
 108. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE REPORT ACCOMPANYING H.R. 6275, 
ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX RELIEF ACT OF 2008, H.R. REP. No. 110-728, at 35 (2008), 
available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_
reports&docid=f:hr728.110.pdf.  Treasury estimated the revenue of a similar proposal at 
$10.7 million for 2008–2017. GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 66. 
 109. Professor Joshua Rosenberg made a proposal that included a requirement that large 
cash withdrawals be reported. See Rosenberg, supra note 35, at 524.  However, it is not clear 
how those withdrawals would be matched with purchases by consumers from particular 
retailers. 
 110. See Bankman, supra note 10, at 510 (“South Korea and a number of Latin American 
countries including Argentina, Costa Rica, Columbia, Mexico and Uruguay have tried to 
reduce the cash economy by subsidizing credit and debit cards.”); Jasper Kim & Kemavit 
Bhangananda, Money for Nothing, Your Crises for Free?:  A Comparative Analysis of 
Consumer Credit Policies in Post-1997 South Korea and Thailand, 17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 
J. 1, 2 (2008) (reporting that a Korean “government initiative provided incentives for 
consumers to use credit cards, such as a twenty percent income tax deduction for those 
whose credit card expenditures totaled more than ten percent of his or her annual income”). 
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customers who might be expected to otherwise pay cash.  The 
government might be left with paying the subsidy only with respect to 
electronic sales that would in any event have been reported for tax 
purposes.111 
A recent government report stated that “[s]ome merchants fail to report 
accurately their gross income, including income derived from payment card 
transactions.”112  However, cash is likely a much larger problem, as it 
leaves little paper trail.  Interview research by Professors Susan Morse, 
Stewart Karlinsky, and Joseph Bankman suggests that most credit card 
transactions are reported.113  Reporting of receipts from payment card 
transactions may help provide estimates of cash underreporting, however, 
by allowing the IRS to compare reported credit card receipts with the total 
amount reported.114  Currently, that requires an audit.  However, to avoid or 
limit the amount reported, retailers could encourage the use of cash through 
cash discounts, as some already do.115 
In theory, the statute raises the potential for duplicative reporting because 
it does not contain an exception for service providers.116  If they were 
included, that could result in duplication with existing reporting 
requirements.117  However, the statute gives the Treasury authority to issue 
“regulations or other guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to carry 
out this section, including rules to prevent the reporting of the same 
transaction more than once.”118  In proposed regulations issued in late 2009, 
 
 111. Bankman, supra note 10, at 510.  In addition, one “obvious problem with 
subsidizing the use of credit and debit cards is that the poor, by and large, do not have either.  
Subsidization of credit card use would raise additional problems of overuse of credit.” Id. 
 112. GENERAL EXPLANATIONS, supra note 35, at 66. 
 113. See Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Cash Businesses 
and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 50 (2009); see also Stewart Karlinsky & 
Joseph Bankman, Developing a Theory of Cash Businesses’ Tax Evasion Behaviour and the 
Role of Their Tax Preparers, in 5TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TAX ADMINISTRATION:  
CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 136, 143 (Michael Walpole & Rodney Fisher 
eds., 2002). 
 114. See Morse et al., supra note 113, at 50–51. 
 115. See Karlinsky & Bankman, supra note 113, at 146 (“Someone in the insurance 
brokerage business who specialises in insuring contractors shared his experience that 
contractors will regularly give a 20% discount for cash . . . .”); id. at 144 (“One practitioner 
told us of a small business owner that opened his store unofficially on Saturdays for certain 
preferred clients and used a separate cash register.  Merchandise was sold on a discounted 
basis for cash only.”); Morse et al., supra note 113, at 51 (“The tax preparers and 
businesspeople we spoke to in the jewelry and construction businesses . . . suggested that 
many jewelers and contractors offer a 20% discount for cash transactions.”).  Nina Olson 
reports that “[c]ash and checks accounted for only 45 percent of payments in 2005, down 
from 57 percent in 2001.” TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
35, at 500.  However, that is still nearly half of all payments.  Moreover, retailers might 
increase the use of cash discounts once section 6050W becomes effective. 
 116. Cf. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 2009 BUDGET PROPOSAL, supra note 45, at 147 (making 
this point regarding a proposed credit card reporting requirement). 
 117. Cf. id. 
 118. I.R.C. § 6050W(g) (West Supp. 2009). 
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the Treasury exercised this authority to provide relief from reporting under 
section 6041 for transactions also covered by section 6050W.119 
This provision offers fewer efficiency disadvantages than the proposal 
for reporting by consumers, discussed above.  Nonetheless, it is less than 
ideal under the six factors provided above.  On the one hand, the possibility 
of collusion between banks and consumers is small.  In addition, banks are 
businesses with a substantial bookkeeping infrastructure.120  Using financial 
intermediaries as the reporting parties also centralizes reporting. 
However, information reporting by financial intermediaries does not 
provide amounts that the government could simply match to amounts on 
taxpayers’ returns.  One useful change would be to require businesses to 
separately report amounts received via payment cards from amounts 
received by check or in cash.121  This would facilitate enforcement by 
making the comparison between cash and payment card receipts more 
obvious to both the IRS and the taxpayer.122 
Even in that case, however, the amounts reported by financial 
intermediaries often would not match the amounts reportable by businesses. 
Nina Olson points out, “gift cards and cash back transactions might make it 
difficult for the IRS to reliably match payment card data against amounts 
 
 119. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-1(a)(1)(iv), 74 Fed. Reg. 61,294, 61,301 (Nov. 24, 
2009) (“Payment card transactions that are described in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section 
that otherwise would be reportable under both sections 6041 and 6050W are reported under 
section 6050W and not section 6041.”).  In the Preamble to the proposed regulations under 
section 6050W, the Treasury Department mentioned several reasons why reporting of the 
same transaction multiple times could be beneficial, including that “the burden for reporting 
may fall on different persons.” See November 2009 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra 
note 105, at 19.  However, the Treasury determined that duplicative reporting was not 
required in this context:  “[F]or payment card transactions, relief from reporting under 
section 6041 is warranted because section 6050W reporting covers all payment card 
transactions and thus effectively encompasses all payments subject to section 6041 reporting 
made by payment card.” Id. at 20. 
 120. The National Taxpayer Advocate recommended that “regulations . . . provide for a 
sufficiently prospective effective date to allow financial institutions to modify their reporting 
systems.” TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 501.  She 
also noted, “[f]inancial institutions that participate in the qualified payment card 
agent . . . program, which allows them to satisfy information reporting obligations for both 
the payee and payor, should have much less difficulty modifying their systems than other 
financial institutions.” Id. at 501 n.54 (citing T.D. 9136, 69 Fed. Reg. 41,938 (July 13, 
2004); Rev. Proc. 2004-42, 2004-2 C.B. 121). 
 121. Form 1120 currently calls for aggregate reporting of “[g]ross receipts or sales.” IRS 
Form 1120, line 1a, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1120.pdf. 
 122. Cf. 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 191, 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/1_09_tas_arc_vol_1_preface_toc_msp.pdf 
(proposing “[a]dding a line to Schedule C so that taxpayers separately report (1) the amount 
of income reported on Forms 1099 . . . and (2) other income not reported on Forms 1099 ”); 
Leslie Book, The Need To Increase Preparer Responsibility, Visibility, and Competence, in 2 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 74, 85 n.50 (2008), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/08_tas_arc_vol2.pdf (“Under the new provision, 
banks and other entities obligated to reimburse merchants using electronic payment card 
mechanisms will need to provide information returns to the IRS as well as the merchants. . . . 
This will allow a relatively easy determination of the percentage of gross receipts that reflect 
these reportable payments.” (citations omitted)). 
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reported on returns.”123  She suggests that the IRS could nonetheless use the 
information “to identify returns with a greater risk of noncompliance.”124  
This provision therefore has efficiency drawbacks similar to those 
associated with information returns for securities before basis was included.  
Most important, it does not get at the cash that is the core of the 
noncompliance problem for small businesses. 
E.  Requiring Gift Tax Reporting by Donees 
Professors Mitchell Gans and Jay Soled have proposed requiring 
information reporting on taxable gifts: 
Whenever a nonspousal donee receives a taxable gift (i.e., a gift that 
exceeds the gift tax annual exclusion or that does not qualify for medical 
or tuition exclusions), the donee would have to file an information return.  
Furthermore, if the donee receives multiple gifts from the same donor, the 
aggregate value of which during any calendar year exceeds the gift tax 
annual exclusion, the donee would likewise have to file an information 
return.  The proposed information return would delineate the names of the 
donor and donee, a description of the property gifted including its tax 
basis, the date of the gift, and the fair market value of the gifted 
property.125 
Superficially, this proposal has some appeal.  The gift tax is unusual in 
that if the party to the transaction who has the primary remittance obligation 
(in this context, the donor) does not remit the tax, the other party to the 
transaction (the donee) becomes liable for the tax.126  In another context in 
which a transaction counterparty were secondarily liable for a tax, that 
likely would create an incentive for the counterparty to provide honest 
information reporting and thereby increase the odds that the primary obligor 
pays the tax. 
However, on closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that subjecting gifts to 
this kind of information reporting would be inefficient and ineffective.  The 
donor/donee context necessarily involves parties who are not acting at 
arm’s length.  There is every incentive for parties who are close enough to 
give or receive a gift so substantial that it exceeds the annual exclusion 
under the gift tax127 simply to collude in avoiding the tax (or conveniently 
remain ignorant of the obligation).  In addition, donees are typically 
individuals who lack the bookkeeping infrastructure that businesses have.  
 
 123. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 500. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Gans & Soled, supra note 36, at 793. 
 126. I.R.C. § 6324(b) (2006) (“If the tax is not paid when due, the donee of any gift shall 
be personally liable for such tax to the extent of the value of such gift.”).  Remittance 
obligations for other federal taxes generally cannot be transferred to the other party to a 
transaction. See Logue & Slemrod, supra note 26, at 50. 
 127. For 2009, the annual exclusion is $13,000 per donee from each donor. Rev. Proc. 
2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107 § 3.30.  A married donor can obtain the consent of his or her 
spouse to give twice that much tax free. See I.R.C. § 2513(a). 
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Also, the ratio of donees to donors is close to one-to-one, so there is little 
efficiency gain in auditing donees rather than donors.128 
Additionally, the gift tax probably is not a major source of tax evasion.  
Its tax base is very small, in part because of sizable annual per-donee 
exemptions129 and in part because of a lifetime per-donor exemption.130  
Gans and Soled note that the tax raises little revenue.131  Given its small tax 
base,132 that is probably not a sign that there is simply disproportionately 
large evasion of gift tax liabilities.133 
For all of these reasons, this proposal would provide little compliance 
benefit to the government if enacted.  Moreover, given that the proposal 
would appear to increase governmental intrusion into family matters, it 
might be met with particularly vigorous opposition.134  Professors Gans and 
Soled propose an alternative that does not pose these problems: 
 
 128. President Obama’s fiscal year 2010 budget proposal contains an information 
reporting proposal targeted solely at consistency of valuation of noncash property transferred 
by gift or bequest.  The proposal generally would require executors of estates and donors of 
gifts to report the value of the transferred property and would prohibit the recipient from 
claiming a higher basis in it (absent later adjustments). See FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE 
PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 119–20.  Like the Gans/Soled suggestion, this proposal, which 
generally would apply to transfers by individuals to a similar number of transferees, does not 
fare well on the metrics of bookkeeping infrastructure and centralization.  The estate and gift 
tax also is not a major contributor to the tax gap. See infra notes 129–33 and accompanying 
text.  The parties also generally will not be acting at arm’s length.  However, the proposal 
may constrain inconsistent valuations for estates subject to estate tax. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2010 
(West Supp. 2009) (providing $3.5 million credit against estate tax for 2009).  Taxpayers 
have an incentive to claim a relatively low value in property for estate tax purposes in order 
to reduce the amount included in the gross estate, see I.R.C. § 2031(a) (2006), or to avoid 
subjecting the estate to tax at all.  Heirs have an incentive to claim a higher value for income 
tax purposes because, under current law, basis in inherited property is the fair market value 
at death. See I.R.C. § 1014(a).  Similarly, in the gift context, the donor will have an incentive 
to claim a lower valuation only if the gift exceeds the annual exclusion. See supra note 127.  
Donees have an incentive to claim a higher valuation only if the property has a value below 
its basis at the time of transfer and is subsequently sold at a loss. See I.R.C. § 1015(a); see 
also FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 15, at 119. 
 129. See Gans & Soled, supra note 36, at 764–65 (noting numerous exclusions, including 
then-$12,000 annual exclusion per donee from each donor); see also I.R.C. § 2503(b), (e) 
(providing exclusions from the gift tax). 
 130. See I.R.C. §§ 2010(c), 2505; see also Gans & Soled, supra note 36, at 763 
(explaining unification with the estate tax, under which tax on lifetime gifts can be deferred).  
For taxpayers dying in 2009, the unified credit for estate and gift tax purposes is $3.5 
million. I.R.C. § 2010(c). 
 131. See Gans & Soled, supra note 36, at 760 (“For 2005, the last year for which there is 
available data, the gift tax raised approximately $2 billion—considerably less than 0.1 
percent of the overall revenue collected by the federal government for the same year . . . .” 
(citing INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 2005, at 1 (2006))). 
 132. See id. at 764–65 (noting that “the gift tax base is far narrower than one might 
anticipate”). 
 133. The gift tax serves in part to “protect the integrity of the estate tax” base. See id. at 
761.  The gift tax is not included in the IRS’s “Tax Gap Map.” See TAX YEAR 2001, supra 
note 10, at 1.  The Tax Gap Map estimates estate tax underreporting at $4 billion. Id.  By 
contrast, it estimates underreporting of business income at $109 billion. Id. 
 134. Gans and Soled recognize this concern but argue that it is overblown: 
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require taxpayers on their income tax returns (Form 1040s) to 
affirmatively answer the following yes-or-no question:  During the course 
of the prior calendar year, did you make or receive gifts from another 
taxpayer that exceeded $X (i.e., the annual gift tax exclusion) and that did 
not qualify for the medical and educational payment exclusions?135 
Although that would not entail third-party reporting, it would make the gift 
tax reporting requirement more salient.  It would also require a donor who 
had made such a gift but preferred not to report it “to affirmatively lie,” not 
just to fail to file a return.136 
CONCLUSION 
Asymmetric information underlies much of the difficulty the government 
faces in enforcing federal tax laws.  The more information the IRS has 
about the taxpayer’s activities, the easier it is for it to enforce the law.  And, 
since voluntary compliance is more efficient than enforced compliance, it is 
most important that the taxpayer know that the government has that 
information. 
Information reporting is a well-known technique for increasing 
compliance, and it does so by reducing information asymmetries.  
Information reporting does not work equally well in all situations, however.  
This Essay provided a list of six factors for evaluating whether information 
reporting in a particular context is likely to be efficient.  In general, the best 
candidates for information reporting are contexts in which a smaller group 
of businesses provides reports to a larger group of payees; those reports 
contain sufficient information for line-item matching with the taxpayer’s 
return; and the taxpayer has limited possibilities of substituting another 
behavior. 
The framework proposed in this Essay suggests that the new basis 
reporting requirement for sales of securities will increase compliance but 
that the new requirements for information reporting by auction sites such as 
eBay and by financial intermediaries in consumer transactions may not 
substantially improve compliance.  The framework also suggests that 
Congress should consider extending information reporting to payments to 
small corporate service providers.  By contrast, it should not require 
individuals to issue information reports on consumer transactions or on gifts 
they receive. 
 
Some commentators . . . would argue that this reporting requirement puts 
recipients in the uncomfortable position of having to “tattle” on donors.  Put 
differently, does Congress really want to have taxpayers’ children (the recipients 
of most taxable gifts) serve as an enforcement arm of the IRS?  Rejecting this 
reporting requirement as overly intrusive miscasts its essence, however, which is 
simply to check and confirm. 
Gans & Soled, supra note 36, at 794. 
 135. Id. at 794–95. 
 136. Id. at 795. 
